An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are logically independent

Condorcet versus participation criterion in social welfare rules

Moulin (1988) shows that there exists no social choice rule, that satisfies the following two criteria at the same time: the Condorcet criterion and the participation criterion, a.k.a., No Show Paradox. We extend these criteria to social welfare rules, i.e., rules that choose rankings for each preference profile. We show that the impossibility does not hold, and one particular rule, the Kemeny rule satisfies both the Condorcet and the participation criteria

Double Voter Perceptible Blind Signature Based Electronic Voting Protocol

Mu et al. have proposed an electronic voting protocol and claimed that it protects anonymity of voters, detects double voting and authenticates eligible voters. It has been shown that it does not protect voter\u27s privacy and prevent double voting. After that, several schemes have been presented to fulfill these properties. However, many of them suffer from the same weaknesses. In this paper, getting Asadpour et al. scheme as one of the latest one and showing its weaknesses, we propose a new voting scheme which is immune to the weaknesses of previous schemes without loosing efficiency. The scheme, is based on a special structure, which directly use the identity of voter, hides it in that structure and reveals it after double voting. We also, show that the security of this scheme depends on hardness of RSA cryptosystem, Discrete Logarithm problem and Representation problem

An axiomatic re-characterization of the Kemeny rule

The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are logically independent